Recently developed toy models for the mean-field games of corruption and botnet defence in cyber-security with three or four states of agents are extended to a more general mean-field-game model with 2d states, d ∈ N. In order to tackle new technical difficulties arising from a larger state-space we introduce new asymptotic regimes, namely small discount and small interaction asymptotics. Moreover, the link between stationary and time-dependent solutions is established rigorously leading to a performance of the turnpike theory in a mean-field-game setting.
Introduction
Toy models for the mean-field games of corruption and botnet defense in cyber-security were developed in [18] and [17] . These were games with three and four states of the agents respectively. Here we develop a more general mean-field-game model with 2d states, d ∈ N, that extend the models of [18] and [17] . In order to tackle new technical difficulties arising from a larger state-space we introduce new asymptotic regimes, small discount and small interaction asymptotics. Hence the properties that we obtain for the new model do not cover more precise results of [18] and [17] (with the full classification of the bifurcation points), but capture their main qualitative and quantitative features and provide regular solutions away from the points of bifurcations. Apart from new modeling, this paper contributes to one of the key questions in the modern study of mean-field games, namely, what is the precise link between stationary and time -dependent solutions. This problem is sorted out here for a concrete model, but the method can be definitely used in more general situations.
The model
We assume that any agent has 2d states: iI and iS, where i ∈ {1, · · · , d} and is referred to as a strategy. In the first interpretation the letters S or I designate the senior or initial position of a bureaucrat in the hierarchical staircase and i designates the level or type of corruptive behavior (say, the level of bribes one asks from customers or, more generally, the level of illegal profit he/she aims at). In the literature on corruption the state I is often denoted by R and is referred to as the reserved state. It is interpreted as a job of the lowest salary given to the not trust-worthy bureaucrats. In the second interpretation the letters S or I designate susceptible or infected states of computers and i denotes the level or the type of defense system available on the market.
We assume that the choice of a strategy depends exclusively on the decision of an agent. The control parameter u of each player may have d values denoting the strategy the agent prefers at a moment. As long as this coincides with the current strategy, the updating of a strategy does not occur. Once the decision to change i to j is made, the actual updating is supposed to occur with a certain rate λ. Following [17] , we shall be mostly interested in the asymptotic regime of fast execution of individual decisions, that is, λ → ∞.
The change between S and I may have two causes: the action of the principal (pressure game component) and of the peers (evolutionary component). In the first interpretation the principal can promote the bureaucrats from the initial to the senior position or degrade them to the reserved initial position, whenever their illegal behavior is discovered. The peers can also take part in this process contributing to the degrading of corrupted bureaucrats, for instance, when they trespass certain social norms. In the second interpretation the principal, the botnet herder, infects computers with the virus by direct attacks turning S to I, and the virus then spreads through the network of computers by a pairwise interaction. The recovery change from I to S is due to some system of repairs which can be different in different protection levels i.
Let q i + denote the recovery rates of upgrading from iR to iS and q i − the rates of degrading (punishment or infection) from state iR to iS, which are independent of the state of other agents (pressure component), and let β ij denote the rates at which an agent in state iI can stimulate the degrading (punishment or infection) of another agent from jS to jI (evolutionary component). For simplicity we ignore here the possibility of upgrading changes from jS to jI due to the interaction with peers.
A state of the system is a vector n = (n 1S , n 1I , · · · , n dS , n dI ) with coordinates presenting the number of agents in the corresponding states, or its normalized version x = (x 1S , x 1I , · · · , x dS , x dI ) = n/N with N = n 1S + n 1I + · · · + n dS + n dI the total number of agents.
Therefore, assuming that all players have the same strategy u com t = {u com (iS), u com (iI)}, the evolution of states in the limit of large number of players N → ∞ is given by the equationṡ
for all i = 1, · · · , d. Here and below 1(M) denotes the indicator function of a set M. Remark 1. It is well known that evolutions of this type can be derived rigorously as the dynamic law of large numbers for the corresponding Markov models of a finite number of players, see detail e.g. in [15] or [16] .
To specify the optimal behavior of agents we have to introduce payoffs in different states and possibly costs for transitions. For simplicity we shall ignore here the latter. Talking about corrupted agents it is natural to talk about maximizing profit, while talking about infected computers it is natural to talk about minimizing costs. To unify the exposition we shall deal with the minimization of costs, which is equivalent to the maximization of their negations.
Let w i I and w i S denote the costs per time-unit of staying in iI and iS respectively. According to our interpretation of S as a better state, w i S < w i I for all i. Given the evolution of the states x = x(s) of the whole system on a time interval [t, T ], the individually optimal costs g(iI) and g(iS) and individually optimal control u ind s (iI) and u ind s (iS) can be found from the HJB equatioṅ Remark 2. The reasonability of this condition in the setting of the large number of players is more or less obvious. And in fact in many situations it was proved rigorously that its solutions represent the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding Markov model of N players, with ǫ → 0 as N → ∞, see e.g. [4] for finite state models considered here.
In this paper we shall mostly work with discounted payoff with the discounting coefficient δ > 0, in which case the HJB equation for the discounted optimal payoff e −sδ g of an individual player with any time horizon T writes down aṡ
Notice that since this is an equation in a Euclidean space with Lipschitz coefficients, it has a unique solution for s ≤ T and any given boundary condition g at time T and any measurable functions x iI (s).
For the discounted payoff the basic MFG consistency equation u As a first step to this objective we shall analyse the fully stationary solutions, when the evolution (1) is replaced by the corresponding fixed point condition:
(4) There are two standard stationary optimization problems naturally linked with a dynamic one, one being the search for the average payoff for long period game, and another the search for discounted optimal payoff. The first is governed by the solutions of HJB of the form (T − s)µ + g, linear in s (then µ describing the optimal average payoff), so that g satisfies the stationary HJB equation:
In the second problem, if the discounting coefficient is δ, the stationary discounted optimal payoff g satisfies the stationary version of (3):
In [18] and [17] we concentrated on the first approach, and here we shall concentrate on the second one, with a discounted payoff. The stationary MFG consistency condition is the coupled system of equations (4) and (6), so that the individually optimal stationary control u ind found from (6) coincides with the common stationary control u com from (4). For simplicity we shall be interested in non-degenerate controls u ind characterized by the condition that the minimum in (6) is always attained on a single value of u.
A new technical novelty as compared with [17] and [18] will be systematic working in the asymptotic regimes of small discount δ and small interaction coefficients β ij . This approach leads to more or less explicit calculations of stationary MFG solutions and their further justification.
Stationary MFG problem
The following result identifies all possible stationary non-degenerate controls that can occur as solutions of (6).
Proposition 3.1. Non-degenerate controls solving (6) could be only of the type [i(I), k(S)]: switch to strategy i when in I and to k when in S.
Proof. If moving from the strategy k to the strategy i is optimal, then g(i) < g(l) for all l and hence moving from m to i is optimal for any m.
Let us consider first the control [i(I), i(S)] denoting it byû
i :
We shall refer to the controlû i as the one with the strategy i individually optimal. The controlû i and the corresponding distribution x solve the stationary MFG problem if they solve the corresponding HJB (6) , that is
where for all
and x is a fixed point of the evolution (4) with
This solution (û i , x) is stable if x is a stable fixed point of the evolution (1) with u com =û i , that is, of the evolution
Adding together the last two equations of (9) we find that x jI = x jS = 0 for j = i, as one could expect. Consequently, the whole system (9) reduces to the single equation
which, for y = x iI , 1 − y = x iS , yields the quadratic equation
, with the unique solution on the interval (0, 1):
To analyze stability of the fixed point x iI = x * , x iS = 1 − x * and x jI = x jS = 0 for j = i, we introduce the variables y = x iI − x * . In terms of y and x jI , x jS with j = i, system (10) rewrites as
(12) Its linearized version around the fixed point zero is
Since the equations for x jI , x jS contain neither y nor other variables, the eigenvalues of this linear system are 
These eigenvalues being always negative, the condition of stability is reduced to the negativity of the first eigenvalue ξ i :
But this is true due to (11) implying that this fixed point is always stable (by the GrobmanHartman theorem). Next, the HJB equation (7) takes the form
Subtracting the first equation from the second one yields
In particular, g(iI) > g(iS) always, as expected. Next, by the first equation of (13),
Consequently,
Subtracting the third equation of (13) from the fourth one yields
From the fourth equation of (13) it now follows that
Thus the consistency conditions (8) in the main order in λ → ∞ become
or equivalently
In the first order in small β ii this gets the simpler form, independent of x * :
Summarizing, we proved the following.
Proposition 3.2. If (21) holds for all j = i with the strict inequality, then for sufficiently large λ and sufficiently small β ij there exists a unique solution to the stationary MFG consistency problem (4) and (6) with the optimal controlû i , the stationary distribution is x I i = x * , x S i = 1 − x * with x * given by (11) and it is stable; the optimal payoffs are given by (15), (16) , (18) , (19) . Conversely, if for all sufficiently large λ there exists a solution to the stationary MFG consistency problem (4) and (6) with the optimal controlû i , then (20) holds.
Let us turn to control [i(I), k(S)]
with k = i denoting it byû i,k :
The fixed point condition under u com =û i,k takes the form
where l = i, k. Adding the last two equations yields x lI + x lS = 0 and hence x lI = x lS = 0 for all l = i, k, as one could expect. Consequently, for indices i, k the system gets the form
Adding the first two equation (or the last two equations) yields x kI = x iS . Since by normalization
we are left with two equations only:
From the first equation we obtain
Hence x kI is of order 1/λ, and therefore
In the major order in large λ asymptotics, the second equation of (24) yields 
Let us note that for small β ik it expands as
Similar (a bit more lengthy) calculations, as for the control [i(I), i(S)] show that the obtained fixed point of evolution (1) is always stable. We omit the detail, as they are the same as given in [17] for the case d = 2.
Let us turn to the HJB equation (7), which under control [i(I), k(S)] takes the form
supplemented by the consistency condition
for all j, where we introduced the notatioñ
The first four equations do not depend on the rest of the system and can be solved independently. To begin with, we use the first and the fourth equation to find
Then the second and the third equations can be written as the system for the variables g(kS) and g(iI):
or simpler as
Let us find the asymptotic behavior of the solution for large λ. To this end let us write
with similar notations for other values of g. Dividing (32) by λ and preserving only the leading terms in λ we get the system
Solving this system and using (31) to find the corresponding leading terms g 0 (iS), g 0 (kI) yields
The remarkable equations g 0 (iS) = g 0 (kS) and g 0 (kI) = g 0 (iI) arising from the calculations have natural interpretation: for instantaneous execution of personal decisions the discrimination between strategies i and j is not possible. Thus to get the conditions ensuring (29) we have to look for the next order of expansion in λ.
Keeping in (32) the terms of zero-order in 1/λ yields the system
Taking into account (34), conditions g(iI) ≤ g(kI) and g(kS) ≤ g(iS) turn tõ
Solving (35) we obtain
We can now check the conditions (36). Remarkably enough the r.h.s and l.h.s. of both inequalities always coincide for δ = 0, so that the actual condition arises from comparing higher terms in δ. In the first order with respect to the expansion in small δ conditions (36) turn out to take the following simple form
From the last two equations of (28) we can find g(jS) and g(jI) for j = i, k yielding
From these equations we can derive the rest of the conditions (29) , namely that g(iI) ≤ g(jI) for j = k and g(kS) ≤ g(jS) for j = i. In the first order in the small δ expansion they become
Since for small β ij , the differenceq j − − q j − is small, we proved the following result. 
Then for sufficiently large λ, small δ and small β ij there exists a unique solution to the stationary MFG consistency problem (4) and (6) with the optimal controlû i,k , the stationary distribution is concentrated on strategies i and k with x * iI being given by (26) or (27) up to terms of order O(λ −1 ), and it is stable; the optimal payoffs are given by (34), (37), (39).
Conversely, if for all sufficiently large λ and small δ there exists a solution to the stationary MFG consistency problem (4) and (6) with the optimal controlû i,k , then (38) and (40) hold.
Main result
By the general result already mentioned above, see [4] , a solution of MFG consistency problem constructed above and considered on a finite time horizon will define an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding game of finite number of players. However, solutions given by Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 work only when the initial distribution and terminal payoff are exactly those given by the stationary solution. Of course, it is natural to ask what happens for other initial conditions. Stability results of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 represent only a step in the right direction here, as they ensure stability only under the assumption that all (or almost all) players use from the very beginning the corresponding stationary control, which might not be the case. To analyse the stability properly, we have to consider the full time-dependent problem. For possibly time varying evolution x(t) of the distribution, the time-dependent HJB equation for the discounted optimal payoff e −tδ g of an individual player with any time horizon T has form (3). In order to have a solution with a stationary u we have to show that solving the linear equation obtained from (3) by fixing this control will be consistent in the sense that this control will actually give minimum in (3) in all times.
For definiteness, let us concentrate on the stationary controlû i , the corresponding linear equation getting the form
with the consistency requirement (8) , but which has to hold now for time-dependent solution g. 
for all j = i. Then for any λ > 0 and all sufficiently small β ij the following holds. For any T > t, any initial distribution x(t) and any terminal values g T such that g T (jI)−g T (jS) ≥ 0 for all j, g T (iI) − g T (iS) is sufficiently small and
there exists a unique solution to the discounted MFG consistency equation such that u is stationary and equalsû i everywhere. Moreover, this solution is such that, for large T − t, x(s) tends to the fixed point of Proposition 3.2 for s → T and g s stays near the stationary solution of Proposition 3.2 almost all time apart from a small initial period around t and some final period around T .
Remark 3. (i)
The last property of our solution can be expressed by saying that the stationary solution provides the so-called turnpike for the time-dependent solution, see e.g. [19] and [29] for for reviews in stochastic and deterministic settings. Proof. To show that starting with the terminal condition belonging to the cone specified by (45) we shall stay in this cone for all t ≤ T , it is sufficient to prove that on a boundary point of this cone that can be achieved by the evolution the inverted tangent vector of system (42) is not directed outside of the cone. This (more or less obvious) observation is a performance of the general result of Bony, see e. g. [27] . From (42) we find thaṫ g(jI) −ġ(iI) = (λ + δ)(g(jI) − g(iI)) + q 
Subtracting the first two equations of (42) (48) Therefore, as we assumed (44), condition (47) will be fulfilled for all sufficiently small g T (iI) − g T (iS) whenever 
which is true under the first assumptions of (43) and (44). Similarly, to study a boundary point with g(jS) = g(iS) we find thaṫ g(jS) −ġ(iS) = (λ + δ)(g(jS) − g(iS)) − (q 
for all times. Taking into account the requirement that all β ij are sufficiently small, we find as above that it holds under the second assumptions of (43) and (44). The last statement of the theorem concerning x(s) follows from the observation that the eigenvalues of the linearized evolution x(s) are negative and well separated from zero implying the global stability of the fixed point of the evolution for sufficiently small β. The last statement of the theorem concerning g(s) follows by similar stability argument for the linear evolution (42) taking into account that away from the initial point t, the trajectory x(t) stays arbitrary close to its fixed point.
